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statute provides that the employee must prove: (1) that there was an injury
resulting in a hernia; (2) that the hernia appeared suddenly and immediately
following the injury; (3) that it did not exist in any degree prior to the injury;
148
and (4) that the injury was accompanied by pain.
Unless specifically classified by statute, any other injury falling within the
Act must be compensated as a general injury; consequently, the employee
will be required to prove loss of earning capacity and disability.' 49 For example, when the employee claims compensation for loss of an eye and permanent disability from severe burns, compensation for the lost eye is awarded
per se as a specific injury while compensation for the burns is awarded only
after proof of the resulting disability. 1 0
The statute also distinguishes between total and partial incapacity by listing
those injuries which are legislatively presumed to be total and permanent.'
For those injuries not listed the claimant has the burden of establishing the
extent and duration of his incapacity.1 52 Even when an employee is unable
to perform his usual task but is capable of performing some labor of a less
remunerative class, he is considered to be partially incapacitated and can receive compensation.' 53 In Guerra v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association,'5 4 the employee sustained a back injury for which he claimed total and
permanent incapacity. After a successful operation the employee returned
to work and was placed on light duty during which time his average earnings
were substantially the same as before the accident. Witnesses testified that
he was able to perform his job without any difficulty. Since the employee
was able to perform part of his usual tasks and to retain employment suitable
to his physical condition, he was awarded compensation for partial incapacity
55
only.'
SCOPE OF THE ACT: BENEFITS
Workmen's compensation encompasses a wide range of benefits including
death benefits paid to the beneficiaries of a deceased employee' 5 and benefits paid to the employee himself both for injuries sustained in the course of
148. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12b (1967); Akin, Workmen's Compensation, 25 Sw. L.J. 122, 125 (1971).
149. See National Mut. Cas. Co. v. Lowery, 136 Tex. 188, 191, 148 S.W.2d 1089,
1090 (1940).
150. See Choate v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 54 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1932, writ ref'd).
151. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § lla (1967).
152. See National Mut. Cas. Co. v. Lowery, 135 S.W.2d 1044, 1053 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Eastland 1939), aff'd, 136 Tex. 188, 148 S.W.2d 1089 (1940).
153. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 11 (1967).
154. 343 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1961, no writ).
155. Id. at 308.
156. TEx. REV. CIrv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 8a (Supp. 1974).
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employment' 57 and for expenses incurred for medical services.' 58 These statutory benefits provided by workmen's compensation are exclusive and are a
partial substitute for the employer's tort liability and the employee's common
law causes of action. 15 9 Compensation is awarded only if the injury or the
death of the employee arises out of and in the course of employment.'6 0
MEDICAL BENEFITS

Section 7 of Part I of the Act enumerates the various medical benefits for
which injured employees are eligible.' 61 For example, physical rehabilitation
will be provided to the extent that the injured employee will be restored to his
normal level of capacity or will be reasonably relieved of pain.' 6 2 However,
the Industrial Accident Board is expressly relieved of the burden of providing
services for vocational rehabilitation. 6 3 The Board's responsibility in this
area is to notify the employee of the services provided by the Texas Rehabilitation Commission available to him and simultaneously inform the Rehabilitation Commission of the employee's condition. 6 4 The employee's difficulty
in obtaining vocational rehabilitation is manifested by the fact that he must
deal with two agencies.
Section 7-e also provides for an artificial appliance to be furnished to an
injured employee if it is found -that it would materially improve future occupational opportunities.' 65 It is implicit though that a prosthetic device will
not -be provided simply for cosmetic purposes.' 6 6 The cost of the appliance
furnished to the employee will be commensurate with his wages or salary,
67
but the insurer is not liable either for replacement or repair.'
Amendment
Section 7 has recently been amended to allow the injured workman the
sole right to select his own doctor and hospital care or to request that the
Board do so for him.' 68 Under -the present statute the insurer no longer has
.157.

Id. §§ 10, 12.

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. § 7.
H. SOMERS & A. SOMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 44 (1954).
Id. at 53.
TEx. REv. Cxv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 7 (Supp. '1974).
Id.

163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id.
Id. § 7-e.
Id. § 7-e.

167. Id. § 7-e.

168. Tex. Laws 1917, ch. 103, § 7, at 269, as amended, Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 8306, § 7 (Supp. 1974) limited the employee's right to recover:
The employee shall not be entitled to recover any amount expended or incurred by
him for . . . medical aid . . . unless the association or subscriber shall have had

notice of the injury and shall have refused, failed or neglected to furnish it or them
within a reasonable time.
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to choose the doctor who will care for the workman nor the hospital that will
be used.' 09 The only obligation that the workman owes the insurer in this
170
respect is notification of the injury.
Incidental Services
Notice of injury is also the only requirement the employee must fulfill in
order to charge the insurance company for incidental care, 171 and it is not
necessary that he give notice each time he requires specific services.' 72 The
following cases, dealing primarily with the rendition of nursing services to the
plaintiff and his right to reimbursement for them, illustrate both the great
amount of judicial discretion in the area of notice and the varying standards
of proof the plaintiff must meet in order to recover for incidental medical
services.
In Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Simon 178 the plaintiff's wife, a graduate
nurse, and his mother-in-law, a vocational nurse, cared for him after his injury. In this instance, the plaintiff's wife was considered competent to testify
as to the reasonable cost of nursing care, and although the plaintiff did not
Charter Oak Fire & Ins. Co. v. Few, 456 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970, rev'd
on other grounds, 463 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Sup. 1971), is illustrative of the law prior to
the amendment. Mrs. Few was injured in the course of her employment. The insurance
company agreed to pay for the medical expenses she incurred immediately following the
accident, but it was not found to be liable for payments to a doctor of her choice after
she had been assigned another by the insurer.
If the workman failed to establish that either the Board or the insurer had not provided medical services, then the insurer was not liable for the employee's medical expenses. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Garcia, 417 S.W.2d 630, 633-34 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Steadman, 415 S.W.2d 211,
217 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Liberty Universal Ins. Co. v.
Gill, 401 S.W.2d 339, 346 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Camp, 367 S.W.2d 952, 955 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Failure on the part of the employee to seek approval by the Board for treatment has
resulted in loss of court jurisdiction over his claim. Paradissis v. Royal Indem. Co., 496
S.W.2d 146, 150 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973), af 'd, 507 S.W.2d 526
(Tex.Sup. 1974).
169. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 7 (Supp. 1974).
170. Id.
171. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Simon, 474 S.W.2d 530, 532 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1971, no writ); see Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Chappell, 494 S.W.2d 159, 160 (Tex.
Sup. 1973); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 488 S.W.2d 565, 573-74 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Amarillo 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
The court in Simon interpreted the part of section 7 dealing with notice:
Notice of the injury within the time specified . . . is sufficient notice to invoke section 7 of article 8306, V.A.C.S., and thus allow recovery for reasonable medical expenses incurred due to an injury covered by our Workmen's Compensation Statute.
Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Simon, 474 S.W.2d 530, 532 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971,
no writ).
172. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Simon, 474 S.W.2d 530, 532 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1971, no writ).
173. Id. at 530.
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actually expend any funds for these services, his claim was allowed. 174 Similarly, in Home Indemnity Co. v. Draper,1 75 in which the plaintiff's wife provided him with nursing care, a physician testified as to the usual fees received
by nurses and sitters. The court upheld the jury award, stating that it was
immaterial to the question of compensation whether the plaintiff actually expended money or incurred a debt for the nursing services rendered. 176 In
both of these cases notice of the injury was sufficient to charge the insurer
for incidental nursing services and testimony as to the reasonable cost of these
services was admitted. 177
These standards were totally ignored, however, in Barrientos v. Texas Em-

ployer's Insurance Association 7 8 in which the jury awarded compensation not

only for injuries but also for nursing services. The award for services rendered was set aside by the court of civil appeals for three reasons. The first
two reasons-that Barrientos could recover compensation for nursing services only if the insurer refused to furnish them, and that since Barrientos had
not actually paid for the services, he had nothing to recover-were directly
contrary to Simon and Draper. 79 The third reason was that the value of
the services was not proven.' 8 0 A registered nurse testified concerning the
usual fees paid to both registered and licensed vocational nurses. The same
type of testimony was accepted in Draper in which the compensation award
for services was upheld, thus more closely adhering to the overall intent of
the Workmen's Compensation Act. 181
Although the medical benefits provided by the Act cover a wide range of
areas, they stop short of comprehensive coverage. Requiring the injured employee -to seek vocational rehabilitation from the Texas Rehabilitation Commission rather than providing it under the Workmen's Compensation Act is
an example of this type of shortcoming. This provision would better serve
the workman by providing vocational rehabilitation incident to any hospital
services rendered under workmen's compensation.
Incapacity
To receive compensation for total incapacity the employee must be unable
174. Id. at 533-34.

175. 504 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e..).
176. Id. at 576.
177. Home Indem. Co. v. Draper, 504 S.W.2d 570, 575 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston

[1st Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Simon, 474 S.W.2d 530,

532-34
178.
179.
180.

(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971, no writ).
507 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Id. at 902.
Id. at 902.

181. Paradissis v. Royal Indem. Co., 496 S.W.2d 146, 149 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1973), afi'd, 507 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Sup. 1974).
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to retain employment requiring him to do the usual tasks of a workman.18 2
Inability to work in a particular occupation is not enough to grant an award
83
for total incapacity.'
Partial incapacity occurs when an injury prevents as employee from performing a part of his usual job, but does not preclude the employee from
obtaining employment that is suitable to his physical condition. 8 4 Both total
and partial incapacities are considered general injuries to the body.' 85 If the
employee suffers a specific injury, the amount of his compensation is governed exclusively by section 12.186
If an injury affects a particular member of the body for which compensation is specifically provided by section 12, the insurer's liability is limited to
that amount, notwithstanding the fact that the injury to the specific member
may result in total incapacity. 18 7 An employee will not, however, be precluded from recovery for total incapacity if he proves that the injury to the
specific member extended to and affected other parts of his body so as to
totally incapacitate him.' 8 An employee who seeks to recover total disabil182. Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Mallard, 143 Tex. 77, 79, 182 S.W.2d 1000, 1001
(1944).
183. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Simon, 474 S.W.2d 530, 534 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1968, writ dism'd).
184. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Smith, 435 S.W.2d 248, 249-50 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1968, writ dism'd); see TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 11 (Supp. 1974).
Compensation for partial incapacity is paid to the injured employee weekly. The benefits are equal to 66 2/3 percent of the d~fference between his average weekly wages
before the injury and his average weekly wage earning potential while he is incapacitated.
Compensation for partial incapacity shall not exceed 300 weeks. Id. § 11.
185. Ruddell v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 482 S.W.2d 382, 383 (Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
The Texas Workmen's Compensation Act divides compensable injuries into two
classes: general injuries, which affect the entire body, and specific injuries, which cause
the loss or loss of the use of a particular member. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306,
§§ 10-12 (Supp. 1974). When the injury results in total incapacity for work, the injured
employee is provided with weekly compensation equaling 66 2/3 percent of his average
weekly wage, but this compensation will only be paid for a maximum of 401 weeks. id.
§ 10.
186. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12 (Supp. 1974). For example, the
loss of an index finger results in the payment of compensation to the employee of 66
2/3 percent of his average weekly wages for 45 weeks, while the loss of a hand results
in the same percentage of payments for 150 weeks.
187. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Helms, 467 S.W.2d 656, 661 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Tyler 1971, no writ); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Polasek, 451 S.W.2d 260, 265
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Coleman v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 297 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1957, writ ref'd).
188. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Helms, 467 S.W.2d 656, 661 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Tyler 1971, no writ); see Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Espinosa, 367 S.W.2d 667
(Tex. Sup. 1963); Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Brownlee, 152 Tex. 247, 256 S.W.2d
76 (1953); Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Polasek, 451 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Brown v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 416 S.W.2d
902 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1967, no writ); General Accident Fire & Life Assurance
Corp. v. Murphy, 339 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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ity payments must proceed in one of two ways. He may rely on proof that
he suffered a general injury to his body resulting in total incapacity to work,
or he may prove that, while the injury was to a specific member of the body
compensable under section 12, it also extended to and affected other parts
of the body causing or contributing to total incapacity thereby bringing
it within the realm of section 10.189
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Helms' 90 is illustrative of the successful use of the second method. Helms was employed in a lumber yard
and injured his shoulder while performing manual labor. He claimed that
he had sustained a general injury resulting in total disability, but -the insurer
contended that the shoulder injury entitled the claimant to compensation for
a specific injury only. After extensive medical -testimony, the court agreed
that Helms had proved that his general incapacity was caused .by an extension
of -the specific injury and affirmed the jury award for total incapacity.' 9'
A different result was reached in Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Marmolejo.1' 2 Following an award for general disability in the trial court, the supreme court reversed and remanded, saying that an injured workman does
not establish a right to compensation for general disability merely by showing
that the specific injury affected his body generally.' 93 The burden is on the
plaintiff to show that his incapacity was a result of the extension of the injury
94
,to another part of his body.1
These two cases, although they arrive at opposite conclusions, are easily
reconciled due to the distinctive natures of specific injuries involved. The
major problem in this area arises in those cases where there is a difficult distinction between the specific injury itself and the extension of that injury.
. Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Polasek'9 5 evidences the extreme difficulty of applying the law to the various fact situations that arise
and the inequity that may result from a rigid application of the rules. Polasek
was injured when a pressurized glass tank exploded. As a result of the accident he hit his head and was knocked unconscious, and because of the flying
glass his eye had to be surgically removed. Polasek alleged that he had sustained a general injury which caused headaches, numbness in his hand and
fingers, and exhaustion. The insurer contended that only a specific injury
('the loss of an eye) had 'been incurred. Although the trial court awarded
189. Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Marmolejo, 383 S.W.2d 380, 381 (Tex. Sup. 1964); Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Stateler, 449 S.W.2d 533, 537 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dalas 1969,
no writ).

190. 467 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971, no writ).
191. Id. at 661.

192. 383 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Sup. 1964).

193. Id. at 381-82.
194. Id. at 382; see Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Espinosa, 367 S.W.2d 667 (Tex.

Sup. 1963).
195. 451 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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compensation for total and permanent incapacity, the court of civil appeals
reversed, holding that Polasek had not proven the extension of the specific
196
injury to other parts of his body.
1f Polasek had not suffered the injury to his eye, the evidence would have
10
been sufficient to find that -the head injury caused the resulting incapacity. T
The jury could have correctly awarded him compensation for total and permanent incapacity because such findings may be based on circumstantial evidence.'1 8 In this particular situation, however, the court felt that medical
testimony was required to prove the causal connection between the injury and
the incapacity. The expert testimony on this point was adverse to Polasek
and overcame the weight of circumstantial evidence in his favor.' 9°
An unfair burden is placed on the plaintiff in such situations. It should
make no difference whether the general incapacity is a result of an extension
of the specific injury to other parts of the body or whether the specific injury
itself caused the general incapacity. In either case the disability is permanent and -the injured workman should be compensated.
The law in this area, at least when the distinctions are as difficult as those
in Polasek, should be applied to allow the injury which entitles the workman the greatest amount of recovery to govern, notwithstanding the fact that
the plaintiff might not meet his burden of proof regarding the showing of an
extension to other parts of the body. The plaintiff's award for total incapacity would compensate somewhat for the loss of the particular member involved.
DEATH BENEFITS

If the injury that the employee sustains results in death, his legal beneficiarises are entitled to weekly compensation equaling 66 2/3 percent of the deceased workman's average weekly wage.20 0 This figure is limited as to both
minimum and maximum amounts. 20'1 If the beneficiary is the surviving
spouse, these benefits are paid until his death. If he remarries, he will be
paid a lump sum equaling the compensation due for a 2-year period. 20 2 This
payment apparently discharges any further liability on the part of the carrier.
196. Id. at 265.
197. Id. at 264.
198.

Id. at 264; Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Arnold, 378 S.W.2d 78, 83 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Dallas 1964, no writ); American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Florez, 327 S.W.2d 643, 650 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston 1959, no writ).

199. Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Polasek, 451 S.W.2d 260, 266 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
200. T x. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 8a (Supp. 1974).
201. Id. § 29. This section provides that effective August 1, 1974, the maximum
weekly benefits shall be 70 dollars and the minimum weekly benefit shall be 16 dollars.
Initially, the amendment provided for maximum weekly benefits of 63 dollars and minimum benefits of 15 dollars. These amounts became effective August 31, 1973 and remained as such until September 1, 1974.
202. Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 8(b) (Supp. 1974).
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Compensatory death benefits payable to children are divided into three
categories. First, compensation is provided for the child until he reaches the
age of 18. If it is found that the child is actually dependent beyond the
age of 18, compensation will continue. 203 The statute does not specify
a time limit on these payments; the question is apparently left to judicial
discretion. Finally, in cases where the child is enrolled as a full-time student
in an accredited educational institution, his compensation will continue until
he is 25 years old. 20 4 This particular section of the statute presents a potential area of litigation as the criteria that constitute a full-time student vary
20 5
greatly.
If death occurs as a result of an injury for which compensation has been
paid, that amount is deducted from the death benefits. 20 6 A lingering compensable injury could thus greatly diminish the total amount of recovery payable as death benefits. This section seems to provide the injured workman
with the morbid incentive to die quickly in order to better provide for his
family. An amendment in the area would be appropriate to change the law
to make death benefits payable in addition to any prior compensation the
employee had been entitled to or received.
Two Theories of Interpretation
According to section 8a the beneficiaries will receive death benefits only
'if the death was a direct result of the injury. 20 7 Consequently, there has been
a great deal of litigation in this area, and the courts seem to have followed
two opposing views in construing this particular statute. In one theory, in208
volving the liberal interpretation of the words "accidental" and "injury,"
circumstantial evidence, along with expert medical testimony, is considered
sufficient evidence to justify awarding death benefits. 20 9 The second theory
utilizes a stricter view. Rather than construing circumstantial evidence in
favor of the deceased's beneficiaries, the courts following this approach demand probative evidence to show the causal connection between injury and
203. Id. This situation usually arises in the case of a retarded or similarly handicapped child.
204. Id.
205. Collins, Workmen's Compensation, 28 Sw. L.J. 134 (1974). The Act also provides for compensation in the amount of 500 dollars for burial expenses to be awarded
in addition to the amount due the beneficiary as death benefits. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 8306, § 9 (1967).
206. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 8b (1967).
207. Id. § 8a.
208. See Carter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 132 Tex. 288, 295, 120 S.W.2d 581, 584
(1938); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 448 S.W.2d 256, 257 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
209. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 448 S.W.2d 256, 257 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Calhoun, 426 S.W.2d 655,
656, 658 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Midwestern Ins. Co. v.
Wagner, 370 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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death. 210 This theory is harsh, and the burden on the plaintiff to prove any
one particular activity as the cause of death is often too great, particularly
since medical opinion often varies tremendously. The liberal view is the
better approach because it allows the courts to use their discretion and award
compensation depending on the facts of the individual situations. 211
The major problem in this area revolves around the conflict of what constitutes sufficient evidence to prove the causal connection between the injury
and death. While it is well established that a strain or exertion may be an
accidental injury within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 21 2
the type of activity that constitutes a strain or exertion is in controversy. Some
Texas courts, liberal in their interpretation, find that almost any activity done
at work falls within the definition of these words, 213 while others equate strain
with over-exertion.2 14 For example, a workman who climbs a ladder while
at work and suffers a heart attack that results in death may be considered
to have suffered an injury within the scope of workmen's compensation. According to the liberal theory the injury, having occurred at work, is sufficient
circumstantial evidence on which to allow the plaintiff to recover. The
stricter theorists, though, would not find this to be adequate and would require direct evidence to prove the causal connection between the injury and
death.
210. Whitaker v. General Ins. Co. of America, 461 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Dallas 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
211. Compare Whitaker v. General Ins. Co. of America, 461 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (work performed must require over exertion)
with Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 448 S.W.2d 256, 257 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (injury during course of employment sufficient proof of causal
connection between injury and death). See also Baird v. Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n,
495 S.W.2d 207, 210 (Tex. Sup. 1973); Texas Indem. Ins. Co. v. Staggs, 134 Tex. 318,
324, 134 S.W.2d 1026, 1029 (1940); Gill v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 417 S.W.2d 720,
723 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1967, no writ); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Grant,
346 S.W.2d 359, 363 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, no writ).
212. Whitaker v. General Ins. Co. of America, 461 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Dallas 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Carter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 132 Tex. 288, 295,
120 S.W.2d 581, 585 (1938); Pan American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Reed, 436 S.W.2d 561,
563 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.
v. Gant, 346 S.W.2d 359, 363 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, no writ).
213. Carter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 132 Tex. 288, 120 S.W.2d 581, 583 (1938); see
Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 448 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1969,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Midwestern Ins. Co. v. Wagner, 370 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Jenkins, 357 S.W.2d
475 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.
v. Gant, 346 S.W.2d 359, 363 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, no writ); Texas Employployer's Ins. Ass'n v. Brogdon, 321 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App.-Forth Worth 1959,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
214. Whitaker v. General Ins. Co. of America, 461 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Dallas 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see O'Dell v. Home Indem. Co., 449 S.W.2d 485 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Monks v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co.,
425 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); General Accident Fire
& Life Assurance Corp. v. Perry, 264 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1954, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

9

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 6 [2022], No. 3, Art. 6

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 6:608

There is a definite need to bring some sort of uniformity to the law in this
area. The disparate decisions resulting from the use of two such opposite
rules will perhaps be abated by the supreme court's decision in Baird v. Texas
Employers' Insurance Association215 in which an employee had suffered
from mild congestive heart failure for more than 1 year prior to his death,
which occurred while he was at work. The question arose concerning sufficient evidence related to strain or exertion. The trial court instructed a
verdict for the insurance carrier, but the supreme court reversed, saying that
"la]n answer to the problem of whether evidence, most often circumstantial in nature, together with the inferences that may be drawn therefrom,
6
present issuable facts, is always difficult in this type of case."' 21
While not overruling the cases which have followed the stricter rule, Baird
does make a strong statement that circumstantial evidence is sufficient in
Texas to prove the causal connection between the injury and death. If this
rule is uniformly followed, the equitable purposes for which workmen's compensation was intended will be more nearly served. 21 7 Only in situations
where it is clearly established that the injury did not cause the death should
the employee be precluded from recovery. As a matter of public policy,
the burden of proving this should be placed on the insurer instead requiring
the plaintiff to prove that a particular activity caused the death.
Beneficiaries
When death benefits are to be awarded the statute stipulates the sole and
exclusive beneficiaries. 21 8 There are two classes of beneficiaries: the first
consists of the surviving spouse, minor children, parents and step-mother, who
receive the benefits regardless of their dependency on the deceased. The
second group, which is eligible for benefits only in the absence of any members of the first group, consists of grandparents, children, grandehildern and
siblings who receive compensation only if -they were dependent upon the deceased for support. 2 9 The award received by a beneficiary cannot be
attached for the debts either of the deceased or of the beneficiary, and it
is paid directly to the designated beneficiary without being administered by
the deceased's estate. 220
Workmen's compensation benefits are conferred solely by statute and are
215. 495 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Sup. 1973).
216. Id. at 211.
217. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Few, 456 S.W.2d 156, 162 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1970), rev'd on other grounds, 463 S.W.2d 424 (Tex.Sup. 1971).
218. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 8a (Supp. 1974).
219. Id.
220. ld.
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not obtained through inheritance.2 2 ' Basing its decision on this rule, the
Texas Supreme Court in Patton v. Shamburger222 held that an employee's
children who had been legally adopted by his wife's second husband were no
longer the employee's minor children and in case of his death, were not entitled to workmen's compensation death benefits. 223 Referring to the list of
legal beneficiaries in section 8a, the court awarded the benefits to the work2 24
man's parents.
This decision ignored statutory language to the effect that benefits shall
be distributed according to the laws of descent and distribution, which, in
Texas, provide -that adopted children may inherit from their natural parents. 225 "Instead, 'the court held, at least as far as death benefits are concerned, that the adoption relationship superseded the natural relationship
"226

Initially, the exclusion of adopted children from their natural father's death
benefits seems inequitable, but -the rule is not actually harsh. Since the children have been legally adopted, they are no longer dependent children
of the deceased. 227 Rather they are provided for by their adoptive father.
Likewise, if the deceased had adopted his wife's children, his adopted
children would receive the benefits. 228 If he had remained single, compensation would be awarded according to statute. 229 If it were obvious that an
inequity would result, the court could more leniently interpret the statute in
20
order to perpetrate justice.
The right to death benefits is derived from statute, and the statute is strictly
construed. 23' The resulting inflexibility sometimes requires the payment of
benefits to those who least deserve them. For example, there is no statutory
provision for discretionary awards of death benefits to persons acting in loco
parentis. The injustice in such a situation is illustrated in Servantez v.
Aguirre232 in which the deceased employee had been raised by his grandfather and had seen his natural mother only once or twice during his lifetime.
221. Patton v. Shamburger, 431 S.W.2d 506, 507 (Tex. Sup. 1968); see Zanella v.
Superior Ins. Co., 443 S.W.2d 95, 96 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1969, writ ref'd).
222. 431 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. Sup. 1968).
223. Id. at 508.
224. Id. at 508.
225. Akin, Workmen's Compensation, 25 Sw. L.J. 126 (1971).
226. Id.
227. Patton v. Shamburer, 431 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Tex. Sup. 1968).
228. Id. at 508.
229. TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 8a (Supp. 1974).
230. Dickerson v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 451 S.W.2d 794, 796-97 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1970, no writ) (holding lower court decision was invidious discrimination).
231. See Patton v. Shamburger, 431 S.W.2d 506, 507 (Tex. Sup. 1968); Servantez
v. Aguirre, 456 S.W.2d 467, 470 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1970, no writ); Zanella
v. Superior Ins. Co., 443 S.W.2d 95, 96 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1969, writ ref'd).
232. 456 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App--San Antonio 1970, no. writ).
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Notwithstanding these facts, his mother rather than his grandfather received
the workmen's compensation death benefits beacuse the grandfather had
233
never legally adopted the deceased.
A more equitable rule would be to allow courts to examine the facts of
each case in which in loco parentis is alleged, and to award the benefits according to a judicial standard of fairness. Even a simple division of the benefits would be preferable in most cases to the present law.
. SETTLEMENTS

Settlement agreements may be entered into whenever the employee's death
or incapacity is the result of an injury sustained in the course of his employment. 23 4 Subject to the approval of the Industrial Accident Board, the insurer may terminate his liability by paying the employee or the employee's
legal beneficiary an agreed upon lump sum. 235 The benefits payable to the
deceased's spouse or children may not be paid in a lump sum, however, except in the case of remarriage or of a dispute as to the liability of the insurer. 28 6 It is within the power of the Board to compel the insurer to settle
the claim in this way, but the Board will exercise this power only in cases
where waiting for weekly compensation benefits would result in manifest
237
hardship and injury.
Although an employee cannot waive his claim to workmen's compensation
benefits under the Act, this provision does not prohibit settlements which include a waiver after an injury has occurred.2 38 Generally, a compromise agreement is entered into only when the employee is in immediate need of
this lump sum payment because he is unable to wait for his weekly compensation benefits or for the results of lengthy litigation. 239 Thus the insurance
company, obviously in the stronger financial position, would be able to outlast the workman through the negotiation process, and the workman, by accepting a settlement of his claim, is likely to relinquish some of his statutory
benefits. 240° Moreover, since a compromise settlement agreement represents
neither an award of compensation nor a denial of such 241 and does not consti233. Id. at 469.
234. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 15 (1967).
235. id.
236. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 8(d) (Supp. 1974).
237. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 15 (1967).
238. Id. § 14. "No agreement by any employ6 to waive his rights to compensation
under this law shall be valid."
239. See, e.g., Angelina Cas. Co. v. Bennett, 415 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston 1967, no writ); Pearce v. Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n, 403 S.W.2d 493 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1966), reh. denied, 412 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Sup. 1967).
240. Barnes v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 495 S.W.2d 5, 8 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo

1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Esco v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 405 S.W.2d 860, 863 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

241. Insurance Co. of North America v. Escalante, 484 S.W.2d 608, 610 (Tex. Civ.
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tute adjudication of the issues,2 42 a settlement agreed to by the parties and
approved by -the Industrial Accident Board is not appealable. 243 It can be
244
set aside only by a separate suit in equity.
When the settlement becomes a binding agreement, it supersedes all of the
workman's pending compensation benefits. 245 By judicial interpretation a
workman may legally be compensated for anticipated medical expenses when
such compensation is provided for in the settlement agreement. 246 An example of the inequity that may result is illustrated in Pearce v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association.247 Subsequent to entering into a settlement
agreement, the workman filed a second claim requesting additional money

for medical services for the original injury. By entering into 'the agreement,
however, the workman had relinquished his right to reopen his claim before
the Industrial Accident Board2 48 unless there had been fraud or misrepresentation. 249 Consequently, he had inadvertently relinquished his only practical
opportunity to receive compensation for medical needs which arose after the
compromise became final.
Although section 5 of the Act does make some provision for payment of
anticipated medical expenses in the absence of a settlement agreement, the
employee is required to make his request to the Board, and a 6-month hiatus between requests will result in an automatic denial of the employee's

claim. Section 5 explicitly prohibits the rendition of awards by the Board
or the courts for services not already received by the employee.2 50 ThereApp.-San Antonio 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e); see Barnes v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 495
S.W.2d 5, 8 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Angelina Ins. Co. v.
Bennett, 415 S.W.2d 271, 275 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1967, no writ); Pearce v.
Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n, 403 S.W.2d 493, 497 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1966), reh.
denied, 412 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Sup. 1967).
242. Lowry v. Anderson-Berney Bldg. Co., 139 Tex. 29, 34, 161 S.W.2d 459, 463
(1942); Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Frierson, 455 S.W.2d 370, 373 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, no wtit ).
243. Pearce v. Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n, 403 S.W.2d 493, 495-96, 498 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1966), reh. denied, 412 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Sup. 1967); see Angelina Cas.
Co. v. Bennett, 415 S.W.2d 271, 275 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1967, no writ).
244. Akin, Workmen's Compensation, 22 Sw. L.J. 20 (1968).
245. Barnes v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 495 S.W.2d 5, 8 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
246. Angelina Cas. Co. v. Bennett, 415 S.W.2d 271, 274 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1967, no writ); Pearce v. Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n, 403 S.W.2d 493, 498 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1966), reh. denied, 412 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Sup. 1967).
247. 403 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1966), reh. denied, 412 S.W.2d 647
(Tex.Sup. 1967).
248. Pearce v. Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n, 403 S.W.2d 493, 498 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1966), reh. denied, 412 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Sup. 1967).
249. Pacific Employers' Ins. Co. v. Brannon, 150 Tex. 441, 450, 242 S.W.2d 185,
191 (1951); Angelina Cas. Co. v. Bennett, 415 S.W.2d 271, 275 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1967, no writ); Esco v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 405 S.W.2d 860, 863 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
250. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (1967). This section precludes
awards for future medical expenses:
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fore, the employee is able to negotiate for the inclusion of future medical
needs in a settlement agreement, 251 but he is denied this right if he takes
25 2
the option to plead his case before a jury.
Thus, there seems to be no effective or practical way for an employee to
insure that he will receive payment for future medical expenses. Although
he is allowed by law to negotiate for these future payments when attempting
to reach a compromise with the insurance carrier, 25 3 it is exactly at this point
,that the employee is in his weakest bargaining position and least likely to
get them. If, on the other hand, the employee takes his compensation case
to trial, he will be precluded by operation of law from recovering compensa25 4
tion for his future medical expenses.
The policy reasons for allowing provision for future medical needs in compromise settlements include minimization of litigation and preservation of
freedom to contract. In reality, however, this usually results in relinquishment of some of the employee's statutory rights. This inequity could
be alleviated by a statutory amendment providing that settlement agreements
are to be binding on the parties as to all incorporated terms, except that if
the employee finds that his expenses surpass the amount of the settlement,
he may petition for judicial amendment of the agreement as long as the new
medical needs relate to the original injury. Amending the award only if it
relates to the original claim as well as the discretion of the Board or the court
would restrain employees from petitioning for unwarranted claims.
The reason for prohibiting jury awards for future medical expenses is to
prevent any awards for services which might never be received. The better
rule might be to allow an award for future medical expenses if the jury finds
that the potential expenses reasonably might be incurred. This approach
would eliminate the multiplicity of suits that can arise under the present statute which allows the insurer to contest the employee's request for additional
25
funds after -the trial has been completed. 1
no award of the Board, and no judgment of the court . . . for the cost or
expense of . . . medical aid . . . shall include in such award or judgment any
cost or expense of any such items not actually furnished to and received by the
employee prior to the date of said award or judgment.
251. Angelina Cas. Co. v. Bennett, 415 S.W.2d 271, 274 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1967, no writ).
252. Bituminous Cas. Co. v. Whitaker, 356 S.W.2d 835, 837 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1962, no writ) (jury award for future medical benefits held invalid).
253. Angelina Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 415 S.W.2d 271, 275 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1967, no writ); Pearce v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 403 S.W.2d 493, 498 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1966), reh. denied, 412 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Sup. 1967).
254. TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (1967); see Angelina Cas. Co. v. Bennett, 415 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1967, no writ); Pearce v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 403 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1966), reh. denied, 412
S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Sup. 1967).
255. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (1967).
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